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The conventional arguments for providing basic environmental services to the poor in
less developed country (LDC) cities run to externalities and merit-goods.3 These arguments
urge that cities make some kind of basic service available to the poor because they will
otherwise suffer socially unacceptable consequences to themselves and/or impose negative
externalities on others.
We offer different kinds of arguments for providing basic environmental services to
the poor -in LDC cities: second-best efficiency arguments. When the poor are many and very
poor, the city may maximize social welfare, within a budget constraint, by offering two kinds
of basic services to its residents, a first-class service that the rich will want and a second-class
' An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Western Economic Association
meetings at Lake Tahoe, CA in June, 1993. The authors received financial support in the
preparation of this paper from US Agency for International Development through EPAT/MUCIA.
2 Department of Economics, Lorch Hall, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109
(E-mail: CAROLYN.FISCHER@UM.CC.UMICH.EDU or GD46@UM.CC.UMICH.EDU). We
are indebted to Jane Hall for suggesting that we formalize these arguments.' For a survey of the conventional issues and criteria for urban environmental service
provision and pricing, see Bahl and Linn, 1992, Chapters 9 and 10.
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service that the poor will be able to afford. The cases considered here can be added to the
well-known merit-good and externality arguments. These arguments also give a theoretical
foundation to the growing practice of offering different classes of service at different prices to
different income groups in LDC cities.
This concern about differential provision of urban environmental services is not just a
theoretical point. Consider three important examples where three different classes of service
are possible. For drinking water, there are in-house taps, neighborhood taps or kiosks, and
distant unclean rivers or pools. For sewage, there are in-house flush toilets, neighborhood
flush or chemical latrines, and "bush toilets". And for solid waste collection, there are regular
curbside pickups, neighborhood dumpsters, and private scavenging with on-street litter and
degradation. In each case, the first-class and second-class methods are vastly superior to
third-class "provision". Below, we will formally model the supply and-demand -- and pricing
-- of first-class and second-class service provision by the municipality.
What makes these models particularly relevant to LDC cities -- as opposed to cities in
more prosperous countries -- are three things: 1) inadequate revenue sources and hence strict
budget constraints on service provision, which forces LDC municipalities to charge prices
above marginal costs; 2) sizeable income differentials between rich and poor in the cities,
which leads to greatly different effective demands for basic urban services; and 3) large
numbers of poor people, relative to the numbers of rich, which makes the total revenue earned
from the poor and the consumer surplus derived by the poor quantitatively important
magnitudes, despite the low effective demands of poor households.
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What follows are three exercises in maximizing overall consumer surplus -- simply
summed, across rich and poor groups, without income distribution weights -- subject to a
constraint on the total revenue that needs to be generated. In this paper, we will not raise any
issues of externalities or merit-good attributes. But in each of the three exercises, the
possibility will arise that it is socially optimal to provide two types of service and to price
these services in a manner that induces the rich to buy first-class service and the poor second-
class service.
Briefly, the three different second-best efficiency arguments developed here:
1. Price Discrimination. If the municipality needs to raise prices above
marginal costs, its ever higher prices gather revenues from the rich but drive the poor
out of the market. If the poor are so driven out, they neither derive consumer surplus
from consumption nor generate revenue for the city. A two-price system permits the
municipality to charge high prices to the rich, and hence gain high revenues from
them, while charging low prices to the poor, generating both consumer surplus and
revenue there. (Section III)
2. Marginal-Cost Differentials. If the marginal costs of providing different
types of service differ, then the city may be able to generate more consumer surplus
for any given total revenue by offering different services to different income groups.
(Section IV)
3. Capital-Market Imperfections. If there are once-and-for-all hookup costs to
be covered, and the interest rates of the poor are distorted upward by capital-market
imperfections, then the city may be able to increase total consumer surplus, for any
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given present value of total revenue, by offering the poor subsidized hookup. The
subsidies would then be recaptured through either higher hookup fees on the rich or
higher per-unit prices for all users. (Section V)
Section II develops the demand and cost framework that will be used for each of these three
cases.
II. The Demand for the Two Types of Service
Consider two groups of municipal residents, which for brevity we will call the Rich
and the Poor (with subscripts i equal to r and p, respectively). They have identical tastes for
a particular urban service, though they do not have identical incomes with which to purchase
it. The service can be made available in two different ways, which we will call "first-class"
service and "second-class" service (with subscripts j equal to 1 and 2, respectively).
Households, whether Rich or Poor, must decide which of the two classes of services to
purchase, and how much of that service to consume.'
Since the purpose of the paper is simply to show the existence of these second-best
arguments, any plausible demand structure will suffice. So we choose a very simple demand
structure. All Rich households are identical, and all Poor households are identical. Demand
by each household in each income group for each type of service is assumed to be linear,
ranging from a willingness to pay for the first unit of the jth service of AXY,, (where A is the
fraction of income that each group is willing to pay and Y, is the income of each member of
Of course, if the prices of the services are sufficiently high, a household may decide to
purchase neither first-class service nor second-class service, relying either on no service at all or
on some private-sector "third-class" delivery system -- which is not modeled here.
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the group) down to a maximum consumption level of B, (where the household is satiated at a
price of zero). In functional form, the quantity demanded of thejth service by a household in
the Ith income group (Qg) is
(1) Qufj 0 VP,>A=0
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3. Households never buy both types of service; they buy first-class service or
second-class service or neither service, depending upon which choice maximizes their
consumer surplus.
Some assumptions about parameters are sensible. Of course, Y,>Y,, by the definition
of Rich and Poor. A,>A 2, because every household is willing to pay more for the first unit of
first-class service than for the first unit of second-class service, whatever its income. B,>B,,
because the satiation point is reached at a higher consumption level for first-class service than
for second-class service. We will also assume that the numbers of the Poor (N,) are greater
than the Rich (N,).
Figure 1 illustrates the market demand curves for all the Rich and all the Poor for
service type J.
Note three things about the demand function:
1. The point of satiation (i.e. B1) is independent of income. The reason for this
is that, at a price of zero, income provides no constraint to consumption; since each
income group has identical tastes, each reaches satiation at the same consumption
level.' But the point of satiation differs according to which service is received.
2. The relevant elasticities will depend upon where the household is located on
the demand curve. The price elasticity of demand for the service ranges from infinity
(when Q1 is zero) to zero (when P is zero). The income elasticity also ranges from




' This means that, for the demand curve for either class of service, the price-axis intercept
is assumed to depend upon income, but the quantity-axis intercept is assumed not o depend upon
income. While this seems a reasonable simple characterization of the demand for many
municipal environmental services, it does ignore complementarity -- the Rich own pools, gardens,
and washing machines and hence would consume more water than the Poor (of either class of
service) were it free. Most of the results below follow if Bj is changed throughout to BYj,




We also need some information about the costs of providing these services. Again, to
keep things very simple, we assume that there are constant marginal costs to supplying each
class of service, C." But there are also overhead costs to the system of providing these
services. The municipality is assumed to be constrained fiscally, and it must raise revenues
beyond its marginal costs to help meet these overhead costs -- or to help meet some other
fiscal problem. We shall think of these overhead costs as simply being some unspecified
lump-sum -- independent of the types of service provided. Both of these assumptions are, of
course, arguable, but they will suffice to show the existence of the possibility that it is
socially optimal to provide both types of service.6
Each household, whether Rich or Poor, takes the price structure as given, calculates
how much of each service it would buy if it bought that class of service, calculates the
consumer surplus it would get from this optimal purchase in each class, and chooses the class
of service (or neither service) that offers the higher consumer surplus. The municipality also
measures welfare through calculation of consumer surplus, simply summed across the N, Rich
households and the N, Poor households.
In the range of prices between zero and AjY,, where consumption is positive but not
satiated, the consumer surplus of a particular household of income i buying service type j
(CS1) is
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(2) CS = Q-p)2
or, substituting from equation (1),
(3) CS =B ,-
Finally, we must remember the municipality's need for = total revenue to be
generated from the provision of these services -- where nl total revenue means the revenue
beyond that which covers marginal cost and which becomes available for overhead. In the
range of prices between zero and AMY,, the net total revenue contributed by a particular
household of income i buying service type j (TRy) is
(4) TR. = (Ij-C)Q1
or, substituting from equation (1),
(5) TRU=_ B/64,Y -PPC)
It is the relationship of consumer surplus (CS) and the net total revenue (TR), each
summed over both i and both j, that is the focus of the municipality's choice of price and
service offerings.
In the Sections III and V, we shall set C1=C2=0 since marginal costs play no role in the
argument there. In Section IV, however, they are important.
' A first step toward variation in the overhead cost structure is taken in Section V, where
"hookup" costs and fees are introduced.
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II. '=T First Efficiency Case: Price Discrimination
Figure 2
The municipality is interested in expanding the aggregate consumer surplus (CS) of its
residents, but it also needs to collect net total revenue (TR) in order to meet the overhead
costs of the services. These two goals may conflict. Solving equation (3) for P, and Total RevenueodTy onsder Typl)(By Household Tp n evc ye
0.50
substituting that into equation (5) yields # quadratic relationship between TRt and CS,: x
(6) - --2CS + r 1x
x x
Note that equation (6) ignores marginal costs (i.e. C,= 0 for both j); their existence plays no x
role in this case, and they will be ignored throughout this section. TR, and CS,both rise asP, 0.40
. x * x
is reduced from AJY, to AY/2; in this range of P -- the price-elastic range -- there is no X x
conflict between the increased generation of CS and the increased collection of TR. Thus, the - x x*
o x++ +x
municipality would always choose a value ofP between .0 and AY/2 if it were to offer the ++
0.20 ... 0..... .... ..........+?. .............................
jth type of service just to households of the ith income level. All this is pictured in Figure 2.'o+ X
The municipality has only one decision to make -- the prices of the two classes of o
services it will make available to the city's residents.' We will assume, in this section, that all
residents face the same price structure; the municipality is unable or unwilling to charge 0.00040.
0.00.40 .0
conBLnYr s~pka
different prices to different consumers depending on their incomes.'
x Rich (1) + Rich(2) Poor (1) O Poor (2)
' The parameter values underlying Figure 2 are: A,=0.25; A2=0.20; B,=1.50; B2=1.00;
C,=C=0 Y=6.00; Y,=1.00; N,=; and N,=4.
$ The assumption that both classes of service are offered to all residents is not restrictive,
since the municipality can always charge a high (even infinite) price for a type of service, which
is effectively the same thing as not offering the service at all. Furthermore, there is no change
in overhead costs, by assumption in this section, from offering different types of service.




Once the municipality has set the prices of the two classes of service, households must
decide which class of service they will buy. By equating CS, and CS0 in equation (3), we
can derive the switchover locus of prices (P, and P,) that divides the selection of first-class






Manipulation of equation (7) permits P2 to be written explicitly as a linear function of P,:
P2  = [a - (b)*]AY, + (alb)*P,
again for each i, and where a=A2IA, and b=B1B,.'0 The intercept of equation (8) is negative
for all income levels and is a larger negative the higher the group's income level. The slope
of equation (8) is positive, being greater or less than one as a is greater or less than b.
We can now picture the entire choice set for each income group. In principle, there
are nine possible combinations of choices: the Rich buy type 1, type 2, or nothing; and the
Poor buy type 1, type 2, or nothing. In fact, however, three of these nine possible
combinations cannot be generated by AnX price combination; 1) the Rich buy second-class
service while the Poor buy first-class; 2) the Rich buy nothing while the Poor buy second-
class service; or 3) the Rich buy nothing while the Poor buy first-class service. The
10 Both a and b are between zero and one, by our assumption of the nature of the demands
for the two types of service.
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remaining six possible outcomes, and the combinations of P, and P2 that induce them, are
illustrated in Figure 3."
What type of service, and in what amounts, ends up being consumed by each income
group clearly depends upon the price combination, P, and P2, offered by the municipality.
That combination in turn depends upon the net total revenue (TR) the municipality needs to
collect. Let us start with zero need for net total revenue (TR=O). Clearly, the municipality
will supply both services at zero prices (i.e. P,=P,=0), and all residents, Rich and Poor, will
select the first-class service.'2 This is the origin in Figure 4.
As the needed net total revenue becomes positive, the city's maximization of total
consumer surplus, subject to this positive revenue constraint, will require the municipality to
raise P, above zero. Both groups continue to demand first-class service. Thus, the first
region of optimal pricing as the need for TR grows from zero starts from the origin in Figure
4; it is the dark solid line where P2=0 and P,>0, labeled (1) in Figure 4.
At some positive P,, if P2 remains at zero, the Poor would choose to switch to second-
class service. The exact switchover price for first-class service is found by solving equation
(8) for P, at P2=0 and Yi=Y,. This switchover price is
" The parameter values in Figure 3 are the same as were used in Figure 2. The 0 in Figure
3 indicates that the income group buys neither first-class or second-class service in this range of
prices.
12 Since all residents will choose first-class service here, the price of the second-class service
(P2) is irrelevant. We arbitrarily start P2 at zero.
Figure 4Figure 3
Choices of Rich and Poor among Services
(for various values of P1 and P2)
Optimal Path of Prices
(as total revenue needs increase)
aEI
Firt-c Pric(P)ce (P First-Class Pdice (P1)
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(9) P1  = (1-{ )AI, .
But it is not socially desirable for the municipality to induce the Poor to switch. With the
first-class demand curve to the right of the second-class demand curve at all prices (since both
a and b are less than one), more revenue can be raised md more consumer surplus generated
by continuing to provide first-class service to the Poor. To induce this, the municipality must
begin to raise P2 as it raises P,. Thus, the second region of optimal pricing as the required
TR increases is the upward-sloped stretch along the Poor's switchover (from first-class to
second-class service) line, with the municipality keeping P2 just enough above the switchover
locus to prevent the switch. This stretch is the dark solid line in Figure 4 that is labeled (2).
How far up the Poor switchover line does the optimal pricing locus go? Until no
larger net total revenue can be obtained with both income groups consuming first-class
service. Remember, at P,=AY,/2, the net total revenie extracted from sales to the Poor
begins to decline, though the net total revenue gathered from the Rich continues to rise with
increases in P,. At some point along this switchover line -- at some value of P, above A,Y,/2
-- it is socially optimal to set a price of second-class service low enough to induce the Poor,
but not the Rich, to switch to second-class service. Thus, the third region of optimal pricing
as the required TR increases is the dotted leap to the southeast -- labeled (3) in Figure 4 --
where the Poor switch to buying second-class service while the Rich continue to buy first-
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class service.3 This region (3) is a dotted line, rather than a solid line, because movement
along it does not represent ever larger net total revenue -- the TR is equal at both ends of the
dotted line.
Where in this region are the optimal (P,, P.) price combinations? They are readily
found. Write out total CS for both Rich and Poor (using equation (3) to form the sum,
CS,,+CS2), write out total TR (using equation (5) to form the sum, TR~+TR,), and maximize
this CS subject to the achievement of a given level of TR. 4 This yields the following optimal
relationship between P, and P2:
(10) P2  = (ay)P,
where y = Y/Y,. 5 The dotted line in Figure 4 therefore leaps to a point on this line.
As the required TR continues to grow, P, and P2 continue to be raised along the line
described by equation (10). This is the fourth region of optimal pricing, the dark solid line in
Figure 4 that is labeled (4). In this region, the Rich continue to buy first-class service and the
It is possible that this dotted leap (i.e. region (3)) does not occur, with TR maximized at
the end-point of region (2). To understand this intuitively, simply think of the numbers and the
incomes of the Rich and the Poor being identical -- then there is no scope for increasing TR
through price (and service type) discrimination. In LDC cities, where both the numbers and the
incomes of the Poor and the Rich are very different, the existence of region (3) is eminently
plausible.
"4 Recall that C,=C2=0 throughout this section.
's Equation (10) is simply the locus of points where the price elasticity of demand by the
Rich for first-class service equals the price elasticity of demand by the Poor for second-class
service. This equality of price elasticity often arises in price-discrimination situations. (Equation
(10) is considerably more complex when C, and C2 greater than zero are considered.)
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Poor continue to buy second-class service, with P, and P2 rising proportionately." This
region continues to the northeast until either 1) P, and P, reach A,Y/2 and A,Y/2,
respectively, at which point the maximum FR possible has been attained, or 2) P, and P,
reach the switchover locus at which point the Rich begin to demand second-class service. If
the Rich switchover locus is reached first, then a fifth and final region of optimal pricing
follows this Rich switchover line to the northeast, the dark solid line in Figure 4 that is
labeled (5)." P, must be kept just above this switchover line, so as to keep the Rich from
preferring second-class service." How far does this fifth region go? At P2=AY/2, the total
revenue collected from the Poor reaches its maximum; region (5) certainly extends past this
point. At PA,Y/2, the total revenue collected from the Rich begins to decline; region (5)
certainly stops before this point. Somewhere between these two points, the municipality has
exhausted its ability to increase TR, at any cost in CS."
Figure 5 illustrates all these regions, and more. For the same basic set of parameter
values, the feasible CS and TR combinations are shown for over 400 pairs of values of P, and
" This proportionality only holds if marginal costs are zero. When marginal costs are
brought in, it nevertheless can be shown that the optimal municipal markup over marginal cost
in this region, (Pj-CJyCj, is smaller for the Poor (i.e. for second-class service) than for the Rich
(i.e. for first-class service). Note that this differential markup does aW occur for income
distribution reasons.
" The existence of this fifth region requires that
y < 2 - ,lam.
In the numerical example being used, this condition is met, and hence there is a region (5).
"s Given the assumed shapes of the demand curves, there is never a reason to push the Rich
into consumption of second-class service -- it is always possible to generate both more CS for
the Rich and more TR from the Rich through provision of first-class service.
1 It is also possible that the dotted leap -- region (3) -- goes directly from region (2) to
region (5).
Figure 5
Consumer Surplus versus Total Revenue
(for various values of P1 and P2)
Total Revenua
+ RIC 1 ;Poor, 1 CI RI 1; Poo.2 0 Rid 1:;Poor, 0
X Rich 2Poor 2 X R h2: Poor.O0
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P2 Here, as along the dark solid lines of Figure 4, we see that two methods of providing
the service dominate the others (in the sense that they can always generate more CS and more
TR): 1) if the requirement for net total revenue is low, Rich and Poor are both provided with
first-class service at low price; or 2) if the requirement for net total revenue is high, the prices
are raised in a fashion that induces the Rich to buy first-class service and the Poor to buy
second-class service.
IV. The Second Efficiency Case: Marginal-Cost Differentials
In Section III, the optimality of offering multiple tiers of service provision, along with
different corresponding prices, resulted from the inability of the municipality to discriminate
between Rich and Poor in other ways. If the city had been able to charge different prices to
different income groups for the same service (i.e. P' rather than the same P to each i), then it
would have done so and continued to provide first-class service to both income groups. If the
marginal cost of providing first-class service is less than or equal to the marginal cost of
providing second-class service (i.e. C,sC2), first-class service dominates second-class service in
the sense that one can always get more of both TR and CS from any given household,
regardless of income, by offering first-class service than by offering second-class service.
But when the marginal cost of delivering first-class service exceeds that of delivering
second-class service (i.e., C,>C2), this may no longer be true. In this case, depending on the
2 Values of the prices range over a grid of 0<P,<0.80 and 0<P2 <0.60. That there are far
fewer than 400 observations visible in Figure 5 reflects the fact that different P, and P2
combinations often generate the same CS and TR values.
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income level, second-class service may yield greater TR for any given CS. The conditions
for this are readily uncovered. Equation (8) gives us the iso-CS locus of prices for the ith
income group:
(8) P2 = [a -(b)f1AY 1 + (#bYP1
Equation (5) tells us that TRH,>< TRa for this ith income group as
(11)
A2 I- - I -C
Substituting the iso-CS value of P2 from equation (8) into this condition (11), we find that
TR >< TRa for a given CS as
(12) IY-C 2
Only the greater-than sign was possible in inequality (12) when C,=C2=0 (as in Section III),
but either sign is possible when C,>C2>0 is considered.
Furthermore, it is possible that, when only one service is to be offered to an income
group, the Poor will generate more TR for given CS with second-class service while the Rich
will generate more TR for given CS with first-class service. The conditions for this follow
readily from conditions (12):
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(13) (AY,-C AY,-C,
( ( La)<IAs1 1-C2) A2 Yr~4)
Whether inequality (13) would be met in fact is an empirical question, but it is at least
feasible. It requires, as a necessary but not sufficient condition, that
(14) 4 _ ,_
C, A,
Condition (14) gains meaning by noticing that it m=l be fulfilled if, when the municipality
practices marginal-cost pricing, households with higher incomes are more likely to prefer first-
class service than households with lower incomes.
Even if the city could discriminate between the Rich and the Poor -- that is, charge
them different prices for the same class of service (which we assumed was not possible in
Section III) -- it might choose not to. Social welfare for.given total revenue might be
maximized by offering a single set of prices to both income groups and letting the Rich
choose first-class service and the Poor choose second-class service.
All this, of course, is =R necessarily a second-best argument. Even with marginal-cost
pricing and no net total revenue requirement, social welfare might be higher under a two-
tiered rather than first-class-only system of services. And when the city is revenue-
constrained, providing both kinds of service enhances its revenue-gathering ability -- indeed,
the municipality can collect more net total revenue for any given total consumer surplus by
offering both classes of service. Thus, the marginal-cost differential itself, regardless of the
revenue constraint, can justify offering two types of service.
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V. The Third Efficiency Case: Capital-Market Imperfections
There are really three different kinds of costs associated with the delivery of most
municipal services: 1) the basic capital costs of initiating the system -- the need to cover
which has been the basis here for generating net total revenue; 2) the hookup costs for
attaching any household to this overall system (K,, not considered in the previous sections);
and 3) the marginal delivery costs (C1, considered in the previous section). Here, let us begin
to explore the effects of hookup costs and fees.
The municipality now has four prices to set: P, and P2, the per-unit prices of the two
classes of service, and H, and H2, the once-and-for-all hookup fees for the two classes of
service. The total price of service now involves an interest rate. However, in LDCs in
particular, the Rich and the Poor do not face the same interest rate. Due to capital-market
imperfections (such as asymmetric information or lemons problems), as well as the fact that
administrative costs represent a larger percentage of smaller loans, the Poor have to pay
higher interest rates than either the Rich or the municipality; namely, R,>R,=R., where R, is
the interest rate of the ith group and the subscript, in, indicates the municipality.2'
The annualized net total revenue collected by the municipality when a household of
income group i buys service type j is"
21 Again for simplicity, we assume that the Rich have access to capital at the same interest
rate as the municipality.
2 In this section, all values of TR and CS are given as annualized flows, rather than present
values, in order to keep the equations comparable to those of previous sections. The annualized
flow is calculated in the text as simply the relevant interest rate times the present value -
mortality, depreciation, and horizons are all ignored.
19
(15) TR = R.(Hj-K) + (P-C,)Q1
The annualized "total consumer surplus" of the household of income group i buying
service type j, TSU, is the annualized value of the hookup fee subtracted from the annual
consumer surplus:
(16) 73g = -RfH+ CS ,
where CS, remains as defined in equation (3), a function of price and income.
Each household selects the service type that yields the larger TS, provided that TS is
positive. This lets us derive the locus of switchover prices (P,, P2, H,, and H2) along which
the household is indifferent between the two classes of service:'
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choose first-class service and the Poor second-class service. The upward-sloped portions of
Figure 2 are drawn in Figure 6, for each of the Poor and the Rich, in their original positions
(of Section III, where Hi=O) and in their positions with hookup costs added.4 Notice that the
switchover locus hardly moves at all for the Rich, while it shifts significantly for the Poor.
The higher hookup costs of first-class service, together with the higher interest rates the Poor
must pay, make the Poor even quicker, relative to the Rich, to opt for second-class service.
Can we say anything about'the optimal set of the four prices and fees the municipality
must set (i.e. P,, P2, H,, and H2)? Efficiency in the service market requires marginal-cost
pricing: P,=C, and P2=C2. Were there no capital-market distortions, the Hjs could be divided
in any manner to make up the K;js and whatever additional revenue requirement exists, as
long as Hi meets the switchover constraint and is less than CS/R,. H, as a lump-sum fee,
does not affect the quantity or service choice (within the given constraints). However, if the
Poor face capital-market distortions, charging them a hookup fee creates deadweight loss. In
this case, the municipality must balance the efficiency loss from raising prices above marginal
costs against the capital-market distortions. Given our characterization of total surplus, a
dollar transferred from the Rich to the Poor represents a social gain. To avoid such arbitrage
opportunities involving hookup subsidies, we will restrict ourselves to non-negative hookup
fees.
If the municipality can discriminate between Rich and Poor, it can achieve a first-best
situation by setting P1=C1 and essentially charging the Rich a lump-sum tax, Hy, to make up
24 The parameters are all the same as before, plus H,=.20, H2=.10, R,=.15, R,=.05, and
R.=.05.




where this switchover locus is constrained to the region where the TS is positive for each j:
(18) p <pj< ,j-, AY/~t
When (H, - H2) rises above zero, the switchover locus shifts to the left, and it moves
further to the left the lower is Y, or the higher is R,. Since Y,<Y, and R,>R,, the switchover
locus moves further for the Poor than the Rich. This widens the region in which the Rich
" See equations (8) and (9) in Section III -- the derivation here is identical except that H,
and H2 are added.
Figure 6
Service Choices of Rich and Poor
With and Without Hookup Fees
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any additional revenue requirement. Thus, the capital-market imperfection is ameliorated by
loading all the hookup and overhead costs onto the Rich. The Rich can pay these hookup
costs at lower interest cost, and, as long as the total burden is not too high, the higher cost of
hooking up to first-class service does not drive the Rich to the use of second-class service.
The Poor will choose either first-class or second-class service, depending upon the conditions
outlined in the previous section. However, the switchover and maximum price constraints
become more important when the municipality cannot discriminate. The resulting optimal
pricing problem follows a path similar to that described in Section III.
For simplicity, let us again assume that C,=C=,=K=O (to avoid some of the
complications we observed in Section IV). If net revenue needs are zero, P=C,=( and Hf=0
for both j and both groups consume first-class service. As net revenue needs rise, the
government raises revenue in the area of least distortion. Initially, raising P, above marginal
cost causes a smaller efficiency loss. Once P, reaches the level where a change is equally
distorting on the margin, any further increase in revenue must come from increases in H,.
We shall refer to this point as P,*:
Pie . A1N,Y,Y,(N,+NXR,-R)
= (N,Y+N,Y,)[2R,,-R,(N,-N,) *
At the point where the annualized hookup fee for the Poor equals their consumer
surplus differential between the two services (i.e., when RH, = CS,,(P,)-CS(0) ), H1 and/or
P2 will have to rise as well to keep the poor from switching to second-class service. (Since
0.00 0.40 0.80 1.20
Frst-coss Price (P1)
1.60 2.00
j-1 H1>H2>0 (Poor) - 2 H1=H2=0 (Poor) - 3 H1>H2>0 (RIch) - 4 H1=H2=0 (Rich)
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no one is consuming second-class service yet, we are not concerned with the efficiency of P2
or H=). This point may even be reached before P,' when H,=0.
The maximum possible revenue the municipality could attain offering only first-class
service would be reached when the annualized value of the hookup fee for the Poor equals
their consumer surplus:
(20) ma B (A Y -P1*)2
RHImn 2AYi
IP
However, the municipality would want to switch to two-tiered provision before it reaches this
point of zero total surplus for the Poor.
Efficient pricing under two-tiered service calls for prices equal to marginal cost and all
net revenue needs raised through H,, paid completely by the Rich. Social surplus is greater
when both groups consume first-class service at P,=P,. and H,=0 than under two-tiered
service with P,=P,=0, H2 =0, and H,=VI(R,N,), where V equals the annual revenue from P,' in
the single service case. But raising an additional dollar of revenue in the first-class situation
costs more in terms of social surplus than in the two-tiered case. Thus, there comes a value
of Hr' where social surpluses and net revenues are equal for both cases. At that point, the
municipality must switch to two-tiered service if more revenue is required. The optimal
pricing path will then jump to that equivalent revenue point where Pf=C1=0, IH=0, and N,H,
equals the previous net revenue:
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As revenue requirements increase further, H, alone will continue being raised until the
switchover constraint of the Rich is reached (if it is not already binding when the switch to
two-tiered service is made). Then, to be able to raise H, further, either P2 or Hs must
increase to keep the Rich from switching to second-class service. Here, the municipality must
weigh the capital-market distortion against the efficiency loss of raising P, above marginal
cost.
Maximizing the social TS subject to the budget constraint with the Rich's switchover
constraint binding reveals the optimal P2:2
(22) P* = A2YpY(Np+N,)(Rp-R,) >o
Y,2RNp-Rr(Np-Nr)+NrYp(Rp-R)
To keep the Rich from switching to second-class service while H, increases, the municipality
raises P, from 0 (marginal cost) until it reaches P,*, after which Hz is increased instead.
Essentially, the Rich, who are not credit-constrained, do not mind paying a large lump-sum
fee for the privilege of receiving first-class service; the Poor, however, are credit-constrained,
and they prefer to pay in the form of per-unit charges which their cash flow can handle.
Under two-tiered service, the municipality is able to charge each group accordingly.
The maximum revenue possible under two-tiered provision will be attained when
(21)
(Nr+N,) , V
H1 = HN +
N, NRr





(24) R/X = CS,,(O) -CS2(P) + CS2(P;) .
Unlike in Section III, further net revenue increases are possible by allowing the Poor to drop
out completely and jacking up the hookup fees of the Rich.
Adding positive hookup costs (KpO) should not qualitatively change the analysis;
since they are fixed costs, they should be treated in the same way as overhead, although total
fixed costs will be different depending upon the type of provision. The result is that the
starting revenue requirement will be positive, and the equal net revenue point under two-
tiered service will be associated with a lower H, (if K,>K,>). If K, is large enough with
respect to Ks, two-tiered service may be preferred from the start, since the total fixed costs
would be substantially less than with first-class service.
Therefore, the existence of differing hookup costs, like that of differing marginal costs,
can provide grounds for offering two types of services. Furthermore, the option of charging
hookup fees allows for greater revenue collection without distorting consumption decisions.
Perhaps most importantly, when Rich and Poor consume different classes of services, the
ability to charge different hookup fees allows the municipality to place the financial burden of
the overhead costs squarely upon the shoulders of the Rich.
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When the poor are many and very poor, as they so often are in the cities of
developing countries, and the cities themselves are fiscally constrained, the provision of
second-class environmental services to the poor may be an optimal policy. The belief that all
residents should share the same first-class services may lead to too little or nothing being
provided to the poor -- "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien"".
We have offered three arguments why LDC cities ought not to be embarrassed to
provide different kinds of water, sewage, and solid waste services to different income groups.
When only one price can be charged for each kind of service, a fiscally constrained
municipality can raise the necessary revenues by charging the rich high prices for first-class
service, while still providing a service that the poor can afford, a second-class service that the
rich eschew. When the marginal delivery costs of first-class service are significantly above
those of second-class service, the poor may well prefer a second class service when prices at
least up to marginal costs must be charged. And finally, when the poor face high borrowing
costs, and hence burdensome hookup fees, offering them low-hookup-fee access to second-
class service may ameliorate the welfare loss owing to the capital-market distortions.
Meanwhile, revenue needs are captured in high hookup fees for the'first-class service the rich
prefer.
In short, when direct subsidies to the poor cannot be afforded, because of the fiscal
constraints and the large numbers and low incomes of the poor, second-class provision of
such services may not only be necessitated -- it may be optimal.
VI. Conclusion
' Translated from the French: "The best is the enemy of the good."
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